Tim Elston wrote:Sorry, Tim, but I'm not following this. I think I don't see the meaning; that's why. I believe that the federal government is supposed to be the power of the people--that is, is supposed to be democratically controlled--but is actually the power of a plutocracy --that is, is monopolistically controlled. You say repeatedly that your beef is with the government imposing taxes to spend on social services. In principle I don't have a problem with a modest social security net that does not challenge the nation's solvency. What I have a problem with is the ownership of Washington by big money. We are getting soaked by the banking sysem and by the corporate monopolies that pull the strings of those who are supposed to represent our interests, but don't.
So, as I see you expressing your concerns, your aim would be to weaken the federal government, without a concern to reign in the evil monopolistic power of those in whose control our current government resides. Whereas my aim would be to strengthen the federal government as a seat of The People's sovereignty, to have the muscle needed to put down the exploitative powers that drain the value of our labor through monopolitistic, manipulative means without our even being aware of it. I hear you tipping your hat to the evil of the sellout of Washington to big money, but I don't hear you asking for a government with not only the integrity but also the power to act in the people's interests. I get the feeling that you think government itself is the problem whereas I think that government is a necessary part of any viable solution. That's what I think the Founders had in mind, or else they would not have abrogated the Articles of Confederation and pushed the Constitution.
Still, though, I like most of the constitutional reforms you mention, because they would have a corrective effect on the problem, as I see it. I would fully support a constitutional reform of that nature, but I seriously doubt that it would even rise above the din to be heard, let alone succeed, without catastrophic failure as a change motivator.
I'm not communicating clearly enough, then. I see what you're saying. I've tried to convey and said numerous times that the government sellout has been the problem. I've said, without using the word plutocracy, exactly that it is.
Let me say it in the following ways. Government is sold out to special interests, and it exercises power at the expense of the people for those interests. Those interests include big business, but are not limited to it. The interests also include, heavily, the social interests and those constituencies of many varieties (internal constituencies such as parties themselves included) that insist on more and more governmental power and control of the people and their property. As you have stated, and with which I agree, the monetary policy being based on debt as creation of wealth has, indeed, drained the value of labor without people even being aware of it. That is part and parcel of the problem and must be stopped. It has been done, in large degree, to benefit big business; I'd add, though, that it is those big businesses with which government must deal in order to reach it's ends of power and control, domestic and abroad. That cannot be minimized. Government remains the catalyst.
Now, the government has the power to act in the people's best interests. The Constitution, as written, remains the best authority for power. There are amendments that are needed to restrain government, as I pointed out in the previous post. I'd also add an amendment to tie the judicial branch up on construing Congressional powers, but that's another matter for another time. But, I am convinced that the Constitution already gives the government what it needs.
And, look, I make my living working with government. I realize that we need government. The idea of government is not the problem; it is a wonderful picture of people living in harmony with each other, and order, when a government recognizes the power of people's self-government, individual sovereignty and acts as no respecter of persons (the old saw that we're nation of laws and not of men). To that extent, government is an inestimably necessary part of a viable solution. I wouldn't eliminate government, but I would restrain it to a shell of what it is today. And, it is necessary to have a central government that has some authority in order to have any sense of nation beyond the individual sovereign states, and that central government must have, within its limited, restrained, specific and enumerated powers only, supremacy over the states when a conflict of laws occurs.
One of the problems cited in the Articles of Confederation was the absence of a commerce clause allowing Congress to regulate interstate commerce. I would further amend the constitution to limit Congressional regulatory power so that it could not be used to support welfare programs or any measure that imposes a tax or directs spending. Regulation should be very simply the laying down of rules for private persons and private corporations to follow and the power should not be extended to impose requirements on the states and should be written and held to never support taxes or spending. Another problem was the lack of an executive branch -- you can't enforce what you can't execute, so states could and did ignore laws of the congress.
Yet, when James Madison criticized the Articles of Confederation and promoted the idea of a constitution to provide for a stronger central government, he rightly then blamed the several states for doing EXACTLY what the Federal government has now done for decades and which brings us to a similar conclusion that the system must be fundamentally changed.
Here is a document from Madison describing the "evils", as he labeled them, of the Articles, one being that states changing laws repeatedly, often, and essentially so that no one could know what the law was, and doing do in order to give one state an advantage over another (this problem is not as evident today, except you see it more in water rights cases -- ask Atlanta, for one). But, here is what he said about governmental behavior that "brings more into question the fundamental principle of republican Government, that the majority who rule in such governments are the safest Guardians both of public Good and private rights.":
Representative appointments are sought from 3 motives. 1. ambition. 2. personal interest. 3. public good. Unhappily the two first are proved by experience to be most prevalent. Hence the candidates who feel them, particularly, the second, are most industrious, and most successful in pursuing their object: and forming often a majority in the legislative Councils, with interested views, contrary to the interest and views of their constituents, join in a perfidious sacrifice of the latter to the former. A succeeding election it might be supposed, would displace the offenders, and repair the mischief. But how easily are base and selfish measures, masked by pretexts of public good and apparent expediency? How frequently will a repetition of the same arts and industry which succeeded in the first instance, again prevail on the unwary to misplace their confidence?How frequently too will the honest but unenlightened representative be the dupe of a favorite leader, veiling his selfish views under the professions of public good, and varnishing his sophistical arguments with the glowing colours of popular eloquence?
Using today's speech, people looking for and already in office most often seek/use office for ambition and gain, especially gain. So, they get with other people and create law and policy that brings them what they want, and are no longer guardians of the public good. It isn't enough, Madison said, to hope to vote them out. Incumbents are able to disguise "base and selfish measures" with the sheen of public good and "apparent expediency" (i.e., parts of the Patriot Act, all of the TARP program, just for examples of our day). These people in power then trick people into misplacing confidence in government, duping "honest but unenlightened" people to re-electing him (her). This is 230 years ago. We're very, very dumb, it seems to me, as I read that.
Well, he continues, and here's where our blame lies solidly at our own feet: If you don't want to read this whole thing, just read the bolded parts. It is eye-opening.
A still more fatal if not more frequent cause, lies among the people themselves. All civilized societies are divided into different interests and factions, as they happen to be creditors or debtors--rich or poor--husbandmen, merchants or manufacturers--members of different religious sects--followers of different political leaders--inhabitants of different districts--owners of different kinds of property &c &c. In republican Government the majority however composed, ultimately give the law. Whenever therefore an apparent interest or common passion unites a majority what is to restrain them from unjust violations of the rights and interests of the minority, or of individuals? Three motives only 1. a prudent regard to their own good as involved in the general and permanent good of the community. This consideration although of decisive weight in itself, is found by experience to be too often unheeded. It is too often forgotten, by nations as well as by individuals, that honesty is the best policy. 2dly. respect for character. However strong this motive may be in individuals, it is considered as very insufficient to restrain them from injustice. In a multitude its efficacy is diminished in proportion to the number which is to share the praise or the blame. Besides, as it has reference to public opinion, which within a particular Society, is the opinion of the majority, the standard is fixed by those whose conduct is to be measured by it. The public opinion without the Society will be little respected by the people at large of any Country. Individuals of extended views, and of national pride, may bring the public proceedings to this standard, but the example will never be followed by the multitude. Is it to be imagined that an ordinary citizen or even Assemblyman of R. Island in estimating the policy of paper money, ever considered or cared, in what light the measure would be viewed in France or Holland; or even in Massts or Connect? It was a sufficient temptation to both that it was for their interest; it was a sufficient sanction to the latter that it was popular in the State; to the former, that it was so in the neighbourhood. 3dly. will Religion the only remaining motive be a sufficient restraint? It is not pretended to be such on men individually considered. Will its effect be greater on them considered in an aggregate view? quite the reverse. The conduct of every popular assembly acting on oath, the strongest of religious ties, proves that individuals join without remorse in acts, against which their consciences would revolt if proposed to them under the like sanction, separately in their closets. When indeed Religion is kindled into enthusiasm, its force like that of other passions, is increased by the sympathy of a multitude. But enthusiasm is only a temporary state of religion, and while it lasts will hardly be seen with pleasure at the helm of Government. Besides as religion in its coolest state is not infallible, it may become a motive to oppression as well as a restraint from injustice. Place three individuals in a situation wherein the interest of each depends on the voice of the others; and give to two of them an interest opposed to the rights of the third? Will the latter be secure? The prudence of every man would shun the danger. The rules & forms of justice suppose & guard against it. Will two thousand in a like situation be less likely to encroach on the rights of one thousand? The contrary is witnessed by the notorious factions & oppressions which take place in corporate towns limited as the opportunities are, and in little republics when uncontrouled by apprehensions of external danger. If an enlargement of the sphere is found to lessen the insecurity of private rights, it is not because the impulse of a common interest or passion is less predominant in this case with the majority; but because a common interest or passion is less apt to be felt and the requisite combinations less easy to be formed by a great than by a small number. The Society becomes broken into a greater variety of interests, of pursuits of passions, which check each other, whilst those who may feel a common sentiment have less opportunity of communication and concert. It may be inferred that the inconveniences of popular States contrary to the prevailing Theory, are in proportion not to the extent, but to the narrowness of their limits.
Madison said that three things tend to temper people when faced with the proposition of gain at the expense of another, and that this is especially true in government. In such matters, he asked, what will restrain the majority (in the little-r republican sense) within government from trampling minorities of people and individual people? Three things: 1. Sense of individual good being part of the public good (Madison quickly dismissed that - almost with a laugh, you can sense when reading it - as a serious restraint in operational terms); 2. Respect for character (also dismissed since the blowback of acting badly gets reduced when you've got a large group of people to share the blame with, and when it is a majority, the blame is impotent); 3. Religion (but, then he likens the group-think of majorities to be no more immune to the same ambition and gain tendencies, and proposes that religion, as a practical matter, is not a sufficient guard when it comes to the temptation for power and gain ------ and, that's true today, isn't it, as religious people seek gain, become corrupt, exercise power and so on).
So, Madison proposed a constitution, which as he saw it, would address these issues more appropriately, stating:
The great desideratum in Government is such a modification of the sovereignty as will render it sufficiently neutral between the different interests and factions, to controul one part of the society from invading the rights of another, and at the same time sufficiently controuled itself, from setting up an interest adverse to that of the whole Society. In absolute Monarchies the prince is sufficiently, neutral towards his subjects, but frequently sacrifices their happiness to his ambition or his avarice. In small Republics, the sovereign will is sufficiently controuled from such a sacrifice of the entire Society, but is not sufficiently neutral towards the parts composing it. As a limited monarchy tempers the evils of an absolute one; so an extensive Republic meliorates the administration of a small Republic.
An auxiliary desideratum for the melioration of the Republican form is such a process of elections as will most certainly extract from the mass of the society the purest and noblest characters which it contains; such as will at once feel most strongly the proper motives to pursue the end of their appointment, and be most capable to devise the proper means of attaining it.
One might add to Madison's final contention that a larger Republic needs more central government by recognizing that the large Republic has been made small by regulatory powers becoming so huge that the power of people is made small. Government is enlarged in its scope, people are disempowered. We are larger in number, but we are weaker in power. The behavior of the several states that doomed the Articles of Confederation has, in large part, been repeated by the Federal government itself. Only by tying the hands of government to extremely narrow uses of power under the Interstate Commerce Clause can we hope to eventually undo what has been done, if a reversal were possible at all. Even then, it would also require term limits and other things along the lines of what I suggested. But, I am more pessmistic about the possibility of these things happening than Madison was that the then-constituted USA under the Articles could survive as they were.
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