pastorables wrote:So you are a conspiracy theorist? Do you also believe that 9 - 11 was a ginned up hoax, specifically the attack on the Pentagon?
I am confident that you saw me strongly disagree with Michael Olszta about that. I take
The 9/11 Commission Report, which I have read in its entirety, to be credible. I also find credible the National Institute of Standards of Technology reports,
Final Report of the National Construction Safety Team of the Collapses of the World Trade Center Towers and
Final Report on the Collapse of World Trade Center Building 7, of which I have read substantial portions.
I have read most of the U.S. Senate's
Report on Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials were Substantiated by Intelligence Information Together with Additional and Minority Views, some conclusions of which are as follows:
Senate Report wrote:"Conclusion 1: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor regarding a possible Iraqi nuclear weapons program were generally substantiated by intelligence community estimates, but did not convey the substantial disagreements that existed in the intelligence community" -- Page 15
Several of the report's conclusions like this one demonstrate that the administration cherry-picked intelligence to sell the war.
Senate Report wrote:"Conclusion 4: Statements by the President and Vice President prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq's chemical weapons production capability and activities did not reflect the intelligence community's uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing" -- Page 38
This speaks to the exaggeration of evidence.
Senate Report wrote:"Conclusion 5: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense regarding Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction were generally substantiated by intelligence information, though many statements made regarding ongoing production prior to late 2002 reflected a higher level of certainty than the intelligence judgements themselves." -- Page 50
This shows the exaggeration of evidence.
Senate Report wrote:"Conclusion 6: The Secretary of Defense's statement that the Iraqi government operated underground WMD facilities that were not vulnerable to conventional airstrikes because they were underground and deeply buried was not substantiated by available intelligence information." -- Page 50
This speaks to the fabrication of evidence.
Senate Report wrote:"Conclusion 12: Statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and al-Qa'ida had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al-Qa'ida with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence." -- Page 71
Fabrication.
Senate Report wrote:"Conclusion 13: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional [sic] statements, regarding Iraq's contacts with al-Qa'ida were substantiated by intelligence information. However, policymakers' statements did not accurately convey the intelligence assessments of the nature of these contacts, and left the impression that the contacts led to substantive Iraqi cooperation or support of al-Qa'ida." -- Page 72
Using intelligence to create a false impression.
Senate Report wrote:"Conclusion 14: The Intelligence Community did not confirm that Muhammad Atta met an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001." -- Page 72
Fabrication,
as later known from CIA agent Rob RicherSenate Report wrote:"Conclusion 15: Statements by the President and the Vice President indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States were contradicted by available intelligence information." -- Page 82
Fabrication
Senate Report wrote:"Conclusion 16: Statements by President Bush and Vice President Cheney regarding the postwar situation in Iraq, in terms of the political, security, and economic, did not reflect the concerns and uncertainties expressed in the intelligence products." -- Page 88
Fabrication
Report Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV wrote:"The Inspector General's report, based on extensive interviews and a thorough review of documents, concluded that the policy office in the Pentagon had expanded its role and mission from formulating policy and had inappropriately disseminated an alternative analysis drawing a link between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorists who carried out the attacks on September 11th that the Intelligence Community was unable to substantiate. The Committee uncovered this attempt by DoD officials to shape and politicize intelligence in order to bolster the Administration's policy of invasion in its July 2004 report." -- Page 89
Fabrication to sell the war
Report Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV wrote:"...clandestine meetings in Rome and Paris between DoD policy officials and Iranians in 2001 and 2003, facilitated by Manucher Ghorbanifar, the Iranian exile and fabricator implicated in the 1986 Iran-Contra scandal, in which intelligence was collected but kept from the Intelligence Community....Whereas the Committee's 2004 report presented evidence that the DoD policy office attempted to shape the CIA's terrorism analysis in late 2002 and, when it failed, prepared an alternative intelligence analysis denigrating the CIA for not embracing a link between Iraq and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the most recent report shows that the rogue actions of the office were not isolated....The actions of the DoD officials to blindly disregard the red flags over the role played by Mr. Ghorbanifar in these meetings and to wall-off the Intelligence Community from its activities and the information it obtained were improper and demonstrated a fundamental disdain for the Intelligence Community's role in vetting sensitive sources." -- Pages 88-90
Intrigue, conspiracy, rogue behavior
Report Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV wrote:"Senior Administration officials repeatedly spoke in declarative and unequivocal terms about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and support for terrorists. These declarative statements were not substantiated. In the push to rally public support for the invasion of Iraq, Administration officials often failed to accurately portray what was known, what was not known, and what was suspected about Iraq and the threat it represented to our national security."
"And just when you think you've got me figured out, remember, No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it is not the same river and he is not the same man." --Heraclitus